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
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ATARS/ATC SIMULATION TESTS WITH SITE ADAPTATION LOGIC IN THE PHILADELPHIA TERMINAL AREA

Gary W. Morfitt
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FINAL REPORT

MARCH 1980

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
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16. Abstract The purpose of this project was to provide further evaluation and refinement of the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) concept. The tests were conducted at the National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center (NAFEC) at Atlantic City, New Jersey, using the Air Traffic Control Simulation Facility (ATCSF). Test results indicated that ATARS had no significant impact on the controllers or control procedures in a Philadelphia Terminal Control Area (TCA) environment. Outside the immediate TCA, where the majority of encounters occurred, the factors contributing to the generation of alarms were, in general, satellite operations and the use of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) separation criteria. The incidence of positive resolution advisories was low, averaging only 0.5 encounters per hour.		
Recommendations are to reduce the size of the ATARS desensitization zone at the Philadelphia main airport to approximately 2.0 nautical miles (nmi) from runway thresholds to incorporate a convergence/divergence detection filter into the ATARS algorithm, and to investigate the possibility of reducing tracker lag by improving turn and leveloff detection.		
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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE.

The purpose of this project was to provide further evaluation and refinement of the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) concept. This report presents the results of a series of real-time simulation tests conducted to evaluate the performance of a recently improved ATARS algorithm in the Philadelphia Terminal Radar Control (TRACON). Specific objectives were to determine:

1. The impact of ATARS on the controller and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system in a terminal control area (TCA) environment;
2. The requirement for further desensitization of ATARS in a mixed environment of primary and satellite airport TCA operations;
3. ATARS alarm type, frequency, duration, and location in the terminal area; and
4. A characterization of proximity advisory activity among aircraft in the terminal area.

BACKGROUND.

This effort represents the third set of tests conducted at the National Aviation Facility Experimental Center (NAFEC) to assess the performance of the ATARS algorithm during its evolutionary development. Report No. FAA-RD-76-193 (reference 1) documented the results of a dynamic simulation in the Air Traffic Control Simulation Facility (ATCSF) at NAFEC. The simulation was conducted from May 1975 through September 1975, to investigate the original Intermittent Positive Control (IPC) algorithm. The acronym, IPC, was subsequently changed to ATARS. Report No. FAA-RD-78-138 (reference 2) documented the results of tests conducted in the ATCSF from December 1977 through April 1978 to assess modifications to the algorithm based on recommendations from the 1975 report. These recommendations included alarm threshold reductions and new desensitization logic designed to reduce the number of undesirable alarms experienced in the 1975 study.

The current series of tests was performed from May 1978 through October 1978 and investigated the ATARS algorithm in the Philadelphia TCA. Site-adapted desensitization logic was specifically designed to eliminate interaction between arrival aircraft on converging Instrument Landing System (ILS) courses close to the airport and between ILS and airport surface traffic. The Philadelphia area was selected for several reasons. Primarily, Philadelphia has been designated as the locale where pre-operational trials of the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS)/ATARS engineering model will be performed. In addition, the Philadelphia TRACON facility is responsible for the control of a number of satellite airports which provide a unique, complex, operational test environment. It is a major hub in a series of east coast hub terminals; as such, it is an ideal site for future multi-site DABS/ATARS testing.

DISCUSSION

TEST ENVIRONMENT.

The testing used the real-time ATCSF at NAFEC in a stand-alone configuration. This facility consists of an ATC laboratory, a simulator pilot laboratory, an ATARS simulator, and a target generator. The target generator causes all aircraft to fly in accordance with flight plan inputs. Controller personnel modify the flightpaths of controlled aircraft through a voice link to simulator pilot positions. Keyboard entries by the simulator pilots cause the target generator to respond to the control instructions. All aircraft automatically respond to ATARS commands which are transmitted to the target generator via a simulated uplink. The controller may at any time override the ATARS command by simply instructing the aircraft to do otherwise. As a result, the controller maintains control of the aircraft under his jurisdiction at all times.

The test environment simulated a single DABS sensor site serving the Philadelphia TRACON facility. Testing was accomplished utilizing the ATARS algorithm provided by the MITRE Corporation (reference 3) with new site-adaptation logic incorporated (reference 4). Desensitized zones were designed by NAFEC specifically for the Philadelphia airport. In general, these zones were defined about the ILS approach courses and extended from the end of the runways to the outer markers. In addition, they extended to 500 feet above the runways. Within these zones, ATARS would not issue threat or resolution advisories to either aircraft established on the ILS or aircraft on the airport surface. The intent of these zones was to eliminate undesirable ATARS alarms to aircraft on converging ILS courses and between arrivals and surface traffic. Further details of the desensitized zones are described in a later section of this report.

The simulated ATC facility consisted of 13 ATC control positions; north and south feeder control, Philadelphia local control, Philadelphia satellite local control, visual flight rules (VFR) feeder control, north and south approach control, north and south departure control, north and south satellite control, Philadelphia final control, and the TCA control position. Variations of this arrangement were made to support the various tests, and certain liberties were taken in combining certain positions and controller work assignments due to a limitation in the number of available test controllers. In general, the Philadelphia TRACON operation was faithfully simulated.

Five satellite airports were simulated. These were North Philadelphia (PNE), Trenton (TTN), Coatsville (CVE), Willow Grove (NXN), and Greater Wilmington (ILG). Typical traffic flows in the terminal area are shown in figures 1 and 2.

The arrival flows are shown by dashed lines and the departure flows are indicated by solid lines. No satellite traffic flows are shown. In general, satellite operations represent a highly coordinated effort wherein the satellite controllers direct their aircraft in a way to avoid much of the Philadelphia airport traffic. The locations of satellite airports around the TCA tends to




FIGURE 1. EAST TRAFFIC FLOW TO PHILADELPHIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT




FIGURE 2. WEST TRAFFIC FLOW TO PHILADELPHIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

naturally create crossing route situations with the main flow of traffic. The terminal area included all traffic within a 50-nautical mile (nmi) radius of the center of the Philadelphia airport.

TEST SERIES--GENERAL.

Four series of tests were conducted. Each series consisted of four 1-hour and 15-minute simulation runs. The first 15 minutes of a run were used for traffic buildup and the last hour as the data base. The test series was established for two purposes; (1) to assist in familiarizing the controllers with the environment by studying first the Philadelphia airport and then increasing to satellite airports and greater traffic density, and (2) attempting to isolate the sources of ATARS activity to single airport versus multiple airports and instrument flight rules (IFR) standards versus VFR standards. The test series is identified as follows:

1. Philadelphia airport only, IFR separation = PI,
2. Philadelphia airport only, IFR/VFR separation = PIV,
3. Philadelphia airport plus satellites, IFR separation = PSI, and
4. Philadelphia airport plus satellites, IFR/VFR separation = PSIV

In each of the four test series, all aircraft, whether IFR or VFR, were controlled by ATC. Furthermore, all aircraft were DABS equipped which means that the aircraft are equipped with ATARS and an altitude reporting capability.

TEST SERIES PI--ALL DABS.

This series simulated the Philadelphia airport in a purely IFR situation. The traffic sample density was 75 DABS equipped aircraft per hour. It was assumed that all aircraft were operating under IFR conditions.

TEST SERIES PIV--ALL DABS.

This series duplicated the traffic samples used in the PI series, except that 50 percent of general aviation and air taxi aircraft were operating under VFR. The remaining aircraft were operating under IFR.

TEST SERIES PSI--ALL DABS.

This series introduced satellite operations, and all operations were IFR. The Philadelphia airport hourly rate was 75 aircraft, but 42 satellite aircraft and 2 overflights were added.

TEST SERIES PSIV--ALL DABS.

This series was a mixed IFR/VFR environment with approximately 50 percent of the population operating under VFR conditions. Sample density was the same as series PSI except that seven VFR overflights were added. An overflight is defined as a flight which does not takeoff or land in the Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA).

SPECIAL TESTS.

In addition to the four test series, two special tests, non-mode C (NMC) and uncontrolled (UNC), were performed. The first, NMC, was made to study the interaction between ATARS equipped aircraft and non-mode C aircraft when ATARS issues commands to equipped aircraft. The second, UNC, was run to investigate the interaction between controlled and uncontrolled ATARS equipped aircraft operating in proximity to a TCA.

The NMC run is identical in aircraft density to the PSIV series, but a quantity of ATCRBS non-mode C aircraft, which are not recognized by ATARS, are introduced. Since ATARS is not aware of these aircraft, no ATARS advisories or controller alerts are provided when they are in potential encounters. Altitude information on these aircraft was not displayed to the controller. All the air carrier and air taxi aircraft are DABS equipped. For the general aviation aircraft, 20 percent are DABS equipped, 20 percent are ATCRBS mode C equipped, and 60 percent are ATCRBS mode A equipped.

The UNC run is identical in controlled aircraft density to the PSIV series. Twenty-five uncontrolled VFR DABS aircraft are added and programmed to fly in close proximity to the TCA area. The only responsibility the controller had for these flights was to issue, as necessary and workload permitting, traffic advisories to controlled aircraft. All aircraft are DABS equipped.

SEPARATION CRITERIA.

IFR separation criteria used by the controllers was a minimum of 1,000 feet vertical or 3 nmi horizontal. ATC separation used under assumed VFR weather conditions was 500 feet or 1.5 nmi between IFR/VFR, and VFR/VFR aircraft, and 1,000 feet or 3 nmi between IFR/IFR aircraft. Because of wake turbulence, aircraft were separated from heavy jets by 4 nmi when a heavy jet was behind a heavy jet, and by 5 nmi when a small or large aircraft was behind a heavy jet. These separations were applied to an aircraft if it was operating directly behind a heavy jet at coaltitude, operating directly behind a heavy jet and less than 1,000 feet below it, or if following a heavy jet and conducting an instrument approach. In addition, for landing aircraft, a small aircraft behind a large aircraft required 4 nmi at the time the preceding aircraft crossed the threshold. A small aircraft behind a heavy aircraft required 6 nmi.

TRAFFIC SAMPLES.

The construction of the traffic samples was based on an analysis of flight progress strips. Since the Philadelphia TCA has no specific entry fixes published for VFR aircraft, the entry points used for these traffic samples conformed to the normal IFR traffic flow without deliberately mixing with that flow and reflected a consideration for the high level of experience to be found in Philadelphia pilots. The construction of the uncontrolled traffic sample was based on information derived from VFR flight plans obtained from the North Philadelphia flight service station. More detail on the traffic samples can be found in appendix A.

ATARS ALGORITHM.

The ATARS algorithm used during these ATCSF simulations is a modified version of the original IPC algorithm (Report No. FAA-EM-74-4, change 2). The principal modifications to change 2 include;


1. A uniform detection logic was employed; i.e., controlled and uncontrolled aircraft were treated in the same manner with respect to the detection of conflicts and the issuance of commands.
2. The generation of a Flashing Proximity Warning Indicator (FPWI) or a command would force the generation of a controller alert.
3. ATARS final approach desensitization zones were specifically adapted to the configurations of the Philadelphia runways.

A brief description of the ATARS algorithm and the types of messages generated by ATARS for delivery to pilots and controllers is presented in appendix B.

ATARS DESENSITIZATION.

Previous testing had demonstrated the need for desensitization of ATARS around the airport and its approach courses to eliminate undesirable alarms between airborne and surface aircraft. This also prevented unnecessary alarms between aircraft on parallel approaches. In earlier NAFEC tests, this desensitization took the form of a rectangular volume of airspace about the ILS course(s) within which the ATARS FPWI and command functions were inhibited. Under normal conditions, this method was adequate; however, as indicated in reference 2, improvements were made to minimize the size of desensitization areas while maximizing ATARS protection.

For the Philadelphia study, the size of the desensitization zone was reduced based on the attributes of the environment. Although there are parallel runways at the Philadelphia airport, the separation between the runways does not meet the requirement for parallel simultaneous approaches. For single aircraft ILS intercepts, it was felt that a desensitized zone beginning at the outer marker and extending to the airport would be adequate. Additionally, providing this area of coverage to the surface at the outer marker was considered unnecessary. Consequently, the desensitized zone was designed to be as shown in figures 3 and 4 with a rectangular sleeve of airspace allowing for 200 feet vertical and 0.5 nmi horizontal deviation about the ILS glide slope. To further protect aircraft which are established on the ILS from non-ILS intruder aircraft, an aircraft heading check was incorporated. Aircraft within the desensitization zone whose heading deviated by more than 10 degrees from runway heading were candidates for ATARS FPWI or commands. This was done to protect against aircraft crossing the ILS courses. In addition, an aircraft, even though established on the ILS course within the desensitization zone, was eligible for ATARS service if involved in an encounter with an unequipped intruder. Figures 3 and 4 represent the two operational configurations normally used at the Philadelphia airport; i.e., west for VFR use and east for IFR use. Although both desensitization configurations would be



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FIGURE 3. ATARS DESENSITIZED ZONE FOR THE VFR CONFIGURATION





FIGURE 4. ATARS DESENSITIZED ZONE FOR THE IFR CONFIGURATION

resident in the ATARS logic, only one would be selected by the facility supervisor at any given time. This would prevent any unnecessary desensitization. Arrival aircraft established on the ILS course would not receive commands generated by aircraft on the ground or in the immediate vicinity of the airport. However, if an arrival aircraft should execute a missed approach, ATARS would be automatically reactivated to protect against departing or transient aircraft the moment the aircraft exited the approach sleeve.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

GENERAL.

Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) interacts with pilots and controllers in the following ways;

1. When two aircraft are declared to be in potential conflict, ATARS issues (a) threat advisory Flashing Proximity Warning Indicator (FPWI) to the equipped aircraft, and (b) a controller alert to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) facility.
2. If the potential conflict persists and the command thresholds are met, ATARS issues (a) a resolution advisory (positive or negative command) to the equipped aircraft, and (b) a command notification to the ATC facility.

The events described in 1 and 2 above are generally described as ATARS alarms; however, the command alarm will clearly have a more serious impact on ATC operations.

In the discussion of results, it is important to separate the negative and positive aspects of ATARS/ATC interaction. Negative interaction occurs when ATARS issues threat and command alarms under circumstances in which the controller is using normal ATC procedures and operating within the guidelines of the ATC system. The effect of these undesirable alarms can be disruptive and the controller can become annoyed and casual to the ATARS. An effort will be made to identify the reasons for the alarms and suggest methods for eliminating or reducing them. ATARS positive interaction takes place when blunders in the system occur and ATARS provides a safe resolution service. How well ATARS handles the dynamics of the ATC system and how effective is the resolution attempted is the main thrust of these results.

OPERATIONS RATES.

The hourly operations rates achieved in each series, averaged over 4 hourly runs, are presented in table 1. Rates are broken out by arrivals versus departures at the main airport Philadelphia (PHL) and at the satellite airports collectively. A flight is counted in the operations rate if it either takes off or lands at any of the airports during the data hour. Overflights are counted separately from arrivals and departures. An overflight is a flight which neither originates nor terminates within the Terminal Radar Control

(TRACON) area. The maximum and average instantaneous aircraft counts (IAC) for the 4 hourly runs in each series are also listed.

TABLE 1. HOURLY OPERATIONS RATES AND INSTANTANEOUS AIRCRAFT COUNTS (IAC)

<u>Series</u>	<u>ARV</u>	<u>PHL</u> <u>ARV</u>	<u>DEP</u>	<u>SAT</u> <u>ARV</u>	<u>DEP</u>	<u>OVER</u> <u>FLIGHTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>IAC</u>
							<u>MAX</u>	<u>Avg</u>
PI	25.3	36.3	0	0	0	0	61.5	26.3
PIV	33.8	35.8	0	0	0	0	69.5	23.3
PSI	26.0	36.5	16.5	20.8	2	2	101.8	39.5
PSIV	35.0	34.0	20.0	21.0	9	9	119.0	43.0
								29.1

There was very little variation in operations rates among the four runs within each series. There was only a 4 percent difference between the run with the lowest and highest operations rates.

ATARS ENCOUNTERS.

The ATARS encounters in each 4-hour series were analyzed to determine: the type aircraft involved, the arrival/departure status, the IFR/VFR flight status, the equipment capability (DABS/ATCRBS), and the number and duration of ATARS advisories. All aircraft were DABS/mode C equipped except in the NMC runs. In the NMC series, a percentage of the general aviation aircraft were ATCRBS/mode C and ATCRBS/mode A equipped.

Tabular data are presented which include all encounters where either a threat advisory (FPWI), a resolution advisory (command), and/or controller alert occurred. An analysis of proximity advisories (steady PWI's) is presented in a subsequent section of this report. Appendix B describes the four types of messages provided to aircraft by the ATARS.

PI SERIES.

The first test series was performed to investigate arrival/departure operations at the Philadelphia Airport under IFR operating procedures. A traffic density of 75 DABS/mode C equipped IFR aircraft per hour was simulated. No satellite traffic was present. This series produced only one ATARS encounter in 4 hours of testing, for an average of 0.25 encounters per hour. This result parallels the results obtained in previous simulations of a single airport IFR environment where no ATARS encounters occurred in 4 hours of testing (reference 2). Aircraft density for both studies was comparable. The single ATARS encounter was between an air carrier arrival and a general aviation arrival and produced only one scan of controller alert and two scans of threat advisories (FPWI's). The controller had cleared an aircraft to level off 1,000 feet below another aircraft in level flight. If the vertical tracker had been able to sense the level off sooner, the advisory would not have been uplinked. The aircraft had leveled off when the FPWI was displayed.

PIV SERIES.

This series investigated Philadelphia Airport traffic under mixed IFR/VFR operating conditions. The traffic density of 75 DABS/mode C equipped aircraft per hour was the same as used in the PI series. All air carrier aircraft were considered to be operating on IFR flight plans, and between these aircraft and other IFR aircraft, standard IFR separation was applied. One-half the air taxi and general aviation flights were considered to be IFR and the other half VFR. Within the TCA, 500-foot vertical separation was applied between IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR aircraft. Additionally, when aircraft were within 15 nmi of the radar antenna, horizontal separation could be reduced from 3 nmi to 1.5 nmi.

In this series, six ATARS encounters occurred in the 4 hours of testing which yields an average of 1.5 encounters per hour. Table 2 presents the details of the encounters. The duration of controller alerts (CA) is always one scan less than the total duration of an encounter involving an FPWI, since a two out of three rule was applied to the issuance of CA, whereas, no such rule applied to uplinked FPWI's. This rule required that CA thresholds be violated on two out of three consecutive 4-second scans before issuing a controller alert. No positive commands occurred and only one negative horizontal command of 4-second duration was generated for all encounters. The command encounter was between an arrival and a departure VFR general aviation aircraft. It occurred in the TCA approximately 5 miles from the airport. A plot of this TCA encounter is presented in appendix C (encounter 1). In five of the six encounters, at least one aircraft of each pair was VFR. Hence, VFR criteria was being applied.

TABLE 2. NUMBER AND DURATION OF ALARMS—PIV ALL AIRCRAFT
DABS EQUIPPED—PHILADELPHIA AIRPORT ONLY

No. of 4-Second Scans

Run No.*	Enc No.	Aircraft User**	Flight Status**	Flight Rule**	Total	CA	FPWI	Neg. Adv.**	Pos. Adv.
1	1	AC/AT	D/A	I/V	5	4	5	0	0
	2***	GA/GA	A/D	V/V	3	2	2	1 NR	0
2	3	GA/GA	A/A	V/I	7	6	7	0	0
	4	GA/GA	A/A	I/V	3	2	3	0	0
3	5	AC/GA	D/A	I/I	4	3	4	0	0
	6	AC/GA	A/A	I/V	3	2	3	0	0
4	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* For convenience, runs are tabulated 1 through 4; however, runs were conducted in random order over all 4 series.

** AC = AIR CARRIER, AT = AIR TAXI, GA = GENERAL AVIATION, D = DEPARTURE, A = ARRIVAL, I = IFR, V = VFR, NR = DON'T TURN RIGHT.

*** Example—encounter No. 2; total duration of 3 scans consisting of 2 scans of FPWI alone, plus 1 scan of negative right accompanied by FPWI. The controller was alerted (CA) for 2 of the 3 scans.

PSI SERIES.

In this series, aircraft operating to and from satellites around the Philadelphia TCA were added to the Philadelphia traffic. An additional 42 DABS/mode C equipped satellite operations and 2 DABS/mode C equipped overflights increased the basic 75 aircraft per hour density previously used to 119 aircraft per hour. Standard IFR separation criteria were used as in the PI Series. The control of this environment proved to be particularly difficult for the test controllers. The need to combine control functions, due to a shortage of controller personnel and the general complexity of the area, were contributing factors.

Table 3 presents the PSI encounter data. There were nine ATARS encounters in the 4 hours of testing for an average of 2.25 per hour. Except for encounter 3, which is the only encounter involving an air carrier aircraft, all encounters involved at least one satellite aircraft. Five of the encounters involved at least one aircraft from Greater Wilmington (ILG) to the southwest and an additional three involved at least one from North Philadelphia (PNE) to the northeast. The crossing route structure generated by the satellite airport traffic caused the increased ATARS activity out beyond the TCA boundaries.

TABLE 3. NUMBER AND DURATION OF ALARMS--PSI ALL AIRCRAFT
DABS EQUIPPED—IFR ONLY

No. of 4-Second Scans											
Run No.*	Enc No.	Aircraft User**	Flight Status**	Test Airport	Total	CA	FPWI	Neg. Adv.**	Pos. Adv.**		
1	1	GA/AT	D/D	PHL/ILG	8	7	5	3 NL	0		
	2	GA/GA	A/O	ILG/OVR	9	8	3	0	6 C/D		
2	3	AC/AT	A/A	PHL/PHL	4	3	4	0	0		
	4	GA/GA	A/D	ILG/ILG	9	8	8	1 NL	0		
	5	GA/AT	A/A	ILG/PHL	3	2	3	0	0		
3	6	GA/AT	D/A	PNE/TTN	5	4	5	0	0		
	7	GA/MI	D/A	PNE/NXX	11	10	5	4 NR	2 L		
4	8	AT/AT	D/A	PNE/TTN	2	1	2	0	0		
	9	GA/GA	D/A	ILG/ILG	5	4	5	0	0		

* For convenience, runs are tabulated 1 through 4; however, runs were conducted in random order over all 4 series.

**AC = AIR CARRIER, AT = AIR TAXI, GA = GENERAL AVIATION, MI = MILITARY, D = DEPARTURE, A = ARRIVAL, PHL = PHILADELPHIA, ILG = GREATER WILMINGTON, O = OVR = OVERFLIGHT, PNE = NORTH PHILADELPHIA, NXX = NAVY WILLOW GROVE, TTN = TRENTON, NL = DON'T TURN LEFT, NR = DON'T TURN RIGHT, C/D = CLIMB/DESCEND, L = TURN LEFT.

Two of the nine encounters resulted in negative horizontal commands of short duration and two resulted in positive commands. With the exception of a Philadelphia departure, all other commands were issued to satellite airport traffic. All command encounters occurred outside the TCA. Plots of the four command encounters along with a detailed description of the encounter are presented in appendix C. The major result of the PSI series is the complete lack of any ATARS activity within the Philadelphia TCA and the very low positive command rate of 0.5 per hour over the 4 hours of runs.

PSIV SERIES.

In this series, approximately 50 percent of the population operated under VFR conditions in a mixed IFR/VFR environment. Sample density was the same as series PSI except that 7 VFR DABS/mode C equipped overflights are added.

In the four runs of the PSIV series, the eight encounters shown in table 4 were recorded. All aircraft in these encounters were flying under VFR separation criteria. Four of the encounters resulted in threat advisories only, two resulted in positive vertical commands, and two resulted in negative horizontal commands of only one scan duration. All encounters occurred outside the TCA. Plots of all the command encounters are contained in appendix C. Here again, the major results of the PSIV series are comparable to the PSI series to the extent of no ATARS activity within the TCA, the almost exclusive involvement of satellite traffic in all encounters, and the identical low positive command rate of 0.5 encounters per hour over the 4 hours of runs.

TABLE 4. NUMBER AND DURATION OF ALARMS--PSIV ALL AIRCRAFT DABS EQUIPPED

Run No.*	Enc No.	Aircraft User**	Flight Status**	Flight Rule**	Test Airport	No. of 4-Second Scans			Neg. Adv**	Pos. Adv**
						Total	CA	FPWI		
1	1	GA/AT	O/A	V/V	OVR/PNE	7	6	6	1 NR	0
	2	GA/GA	A/D	V/V	ILG/ILG	9	8	5	0	4 C/D
	3	AC/GA	A/A	I/V	PHL/PHL	3	2	3	0	0
2	--	NONE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
3	4	AC/GA	A/A	I/V	PHL/ILG	2	1	2	0	0
	5	GA/GA	A/O	V/V	PHL/OVR	9	8	5	0	4 C/D
4	6	AT/GA	D/O	V/V	PHL/OVR	2	1	2	0	0
	7	AC/GA	A/A	I/V	PHL/ILG	6	5	5	1 NR	0
	8	AT/GA	D/D	V/V	ILG/ILG	2	1	2	0	0

* For convenience, runs are tabulated 1 through 4; however, runs were conducted in random order over all 4 series.

** AC = AIR CARRIER, AT = AIR TAXI, GA = GENERAL AVIATION, D = DEPARTURE, A = ARRIVAL, O = OVR = OVERFLIGHT, I = IFR, V = VFR, NR = DON'T TURN RIGHT, C/D CLIMB/DESCEND.

LOCATION OF ENCOUNTERS.

In 16 hours of simulation, a total of nine command encounters occurred. Five of these resulted in negative horizontal advisories, three in positive vertical advisories, and one in positive horizontal advisories. The locations of the encounters are shown in figure 5 for the IFR environment, and figure 6 for the IFR/VFR environment. The 20-nmi circle about the primary airport represents the outer radius of the TCA boundary. (See figure 9 for greater detail.) The numbers on the charts represent the encounter numbers found in appendix C. All encounters occurred at or below 7,000 feet mean sea level (m.s.l.) and eight of the nine encounters were vertically or horizontally outside the TCA. The one encounter within the TCA was between a Philadelphia departure and an arrival to the VFR runway 17 at Philadelphia. VFR altitude separation was being applied, and at the time of the negative horizontal advisory, horizontal track divergence was in progress. In eight of the encounters, at least one aircraft of each pair was associated with a satellite airport.


ATARS/CONTROLLER INTERACTION.

The extremely low positive command rate of four aircraft pairs in 16 hours of data collection produced very little interaction with the controller. Negative commands were displayed to the controllers; however, none of these commands affected aircraft flightpaths and so did not interact with the controller. It was observed that controllers did not alter normal spacing or control procedures, operations rates were high, and no missed approaches resulted because of ATARS alarms. The controllers indicated that ATARS messages displayed as blinking characters in the third line of the ARTS III data block were sufficient information for the controller for the few times that they occurred.

AIRCRAFT SEPARATION ANALYSIS.

Figure 7 is a scan-by-scan plot of those encounters (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 9) that resulted in negative resolution advisories. In those encounters (Nos. 1, 2, 4) that actually enter the 500 foot by 1.5 nmi area, the controller is applying separation based on the observed divergence of aircraft tracks. More detailed plots are contained in appendix C.

Figure 8 shows the separation between aircraft pairs that existed during each scan of the four ATARS encounters which resulted in the issuance of positive commands. The type of message; i.e., controller alert, threat advisory (FPWI), or resolution advisory that existed on each scan is also shown. Controller alert and FPWI time thresholds were the same; however, controller alerts were displayed only after thresholds were violated in two out of three consecutive scans. No such rule applied to FPWI; therefore, on the first scan of an encounter, an FPWI was uplinked to the aircraft, but a controller alert was not displayed. In encounters 5, 7, and 8, it is to be noted that although the aircraft are closing horizontally, they are diverging vertically. In these three encounters, the controller had issued instructions to vertically separate the aircraft prior to the ATARS algorithm generating any positive commands. Thus, in these encounters, the controllers essentially resolved the conflicts, although the ATARS controller alert may have attracted the attention of the







FIGURE 6. IFR/VFR ENVIRONMENT ATARS COMMAND ENCOUNTERS



79-33-7

FIGURE 7. AIRCRAFT SEPARATION—NEGATIVE ADVISORIES




FIGURE 8. AIRCRAFT SEPARATION--POSITIVE ADVISORIES

79-33-8

controllers. Encounter 3 was clearly the result of a controller blunder and it was ATARS that saved the day. Both the horizontal and vertical separations decreased until the aircraft responded to the ATARS issued commands. At point of closest approach, the aircraft were separated by 0.3 nmi horizontally and 642 feet vertically.

ATARS DESENSITIZATION ANALYSIS.

In the previous NAFEC ATCSF/ATARS simulation tests in a Chicago-type environment (reference 2), ATARS desensitization zones were considerably different from those used in the Philadelphia tests. One of the objectives of the present study was to provide insight as to the location, size, and shape of the desensitization zones required to site adapt ATARS to the Philadelphia TCA environment. A second point of interest was whether any of the runways at the numerous satellite airports should be desensitized.

All the encounters recorded during these simulation runs occurred either in the vicinity of the satellite airports or at the major crossover points for the Philadelphia arrival and departure aircraft. Very few of the conflicts occurred right at the satellite airports, but rather occurred at those crossover points where Philadelphia traffic patterns intersected the satellite airports traffic patterns. Insufficient encounters were recorded at any given airport to justify desensitization. This may, however, be due to the total density simulated at the satellite airports. Although ATARS was desensitized for aircraft on the ILS approach course at Philadelphia, provisions were made to collect ATARS encounter data in the desensitized final approach zones (FAZ), even though alarms were not uplinked to aircraft inside the zone. This was done for two purposes: (1) to assess the effectiveness of the desensitization zone in eliminating undesirable ATARS alarms between aircraft on converging ILS approach courses, between aircraft on final and surface traffic, and between arrival and departure aircraft; and (2) to gather data that could be used to determine if the desensitization zone could be further reduced in size, thus, providing a higher level of protection closer to the airport. Table 5 shows the total number of encounters that occurred in each series, the number that occurred in the FAZ (not uplinked to aircraft), and the percent in the FAZ.

The percent of encounters in the desensitization zone ranged from a low of 81.6 percent recorded in the PSI series to a high of 96.8 percent recorded in the PSIV series. It is to be recalled that, although FPWI's and commands are generated for aircraft in the desensitized zones, only steady PWI's were uplinked.

TABLE 5. ATARS ENCOUNTERS

<u>Series</u>	<u>Enc Total</u>	<u>* Enc FAZ</u>	<u>Percent FAZ</u>
PI	31	30	96.8
PIV	122	116	95.1
PSI	49	40	81.6
PSIV	104	96	92.3

*Encounters in which at least one of the aircraft was located within the FAZ.

After a preliminary analysis of the number of alarms in the FAZ was completed, additional study was undertaken to determine if even further reduction of the FAZ could be achieved. For this purpose, only the PSI and PSIV series were investigated. These two series were felt to be the most realistic and representative of TCA operations. An analysis was made of the distance from the runway threshold when the first FPWI would have been uplinked to an arrival aircraft in an ATARS encounter, had it not been inhibited by the desensitization logic. For departure aircraft, a determination was made of the distance from the runway threshold when the last FPWI would have been uplinked had it not been inhibited.

Tables 6 and 7 show the number of aircraft that would have received FPWI's at the indicated distances from runway threshold had the desensitization not been in effect. As can be seen in table 6, in the PSI series, all conflicts occurred within 1.0 nmi of the runway thresholds. In table 7, in the PSIV series, 98 percent of the arrivals and all of the departure ATARS encounters occurred within 1.5 nmi of the runway threshold. The remaining 2 percent occurred 1.5 to 2 nmi from runway threshold. Based on this analysis, the Philadelphia ATARS desensitization zone used in this study, which extended to the outer marker, can be further reduced to less than half the distance (about 2 nmi) from the runway to the outer marker.

CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE LOGIC.

In the algorithm used in the 1975/1976 ATCSF/ATARS tests, special checks were made on a conflict pair to test the relative times of horizontal and vertical convergence. The special logic looked at both the horizontal and vertical dimensions simultaneously, and inhibited generation of controller alert, FPWI's and commands when the aircraft were projected to be converging in one dimension, but diverging in the other. Basically, the relative positions of the aircraft pair in both dimensions were projected to determine if conflict thresholds were simultaneously violated. See reference 3 for a more detailed explanation of this logic. This special logic was not used in the current tests. Had the algorithm contained the convergence/divergence logic, two of the command encounters that occurred in the PSI series, and two in the PSIV series would have been reduced in duration by one or two scans. None of the command encounters would have been completely eliminated. In fact, all four of the aforementioned command encounters would have had two scans of commands generated, even with the special logic. Some form of convergence/divergence logic should, however, be incorporated into all future versions of the ATARS algorithm.

VERTICAL TRACKER LAG.

Vertical tracker lag continues to impact the performance of the ATARS algorithm in that it is responsible for either triggering an alarm unnecessarily or continuing it unnecessarily. This is particularly true under VFR separation procedures when aircraft are leveling off 500 feet below or above an aircraft in level flight. The tracker overshoots the level off and triggers an alarm. An analysis of the track plots of all encounters indicated that in seven encounters, tracker lag was involved in either triggering an advisory unnecessarily or extending its duration. The tracker lag did not have a significant impact in the nine command encounters.

TABLE 6. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND DISTANCE FROM RUNWAY
WHEN FIRST FPWI UPLINKED—PSI SERIES

DISTANCE FROM RUNWAY THRESHOLD	RUNWAY			TOTAL NO. OF AIRCRAFT
	ARR	DEP	DEP	
9R	9L	17		
ON RUNWAY	16*	33*	9	58
0.0 - 0.5 nmi	13	0	3	16
0.5 - 1.0 nmi	5	0	0	5
TOTAL	34	33	12	79

TABLE 7. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND DISTANCE FROM RUNWAY
WHEN FIRST FPWI UPLINKED—PSIV SERIES

DISTANCE FROM RUNWAY THRESHOLD	RUNWAY				TOTAL
	ARR	ARR	DEP	DEP	
27R	17	27L	17		
ON RUNWAY	24*	7	25*	17	73
0.0 - 0.5 nmi	5	10	0	5	20
0.5 - 1.0 nmi	11	17	0	0	28
1.0 - 1.5 nmi	32	8	0	0	40
1.5 - 2.0 nmi	1	1	0	0	2
TOTAL	73	43	25	22	163

* Includes one scan duration uplinks on runway

UNCONTROLLED SERIES SPECIAL TESTS.

At the conclusion of formal data collection, several test runs were conducted which introduced a quantity of uncontrolled aircraft into the simulated environment. VFR flight plans were obtained from the North Philadelphia Flight Service Station (FSS) and were studied to determine flight tracks for uncontrolled aircraft. The data proved to be inadequate since the intended courses in the immediate vicinity of the Philadelphia area were not indicated. Information was not provided on whether the pilot would remain uncontrolled or would contact Philadelphia approach control and become a controlled flight. In order to develop and verify a traffic model of uncontrolled aircraft in the Philadelphia terminal area, a more extensive and time consuming data collection and analysis would have been required. For this study, it sufficed to develop a realistic uncontrolled traffic sample which could be used to highlight problem areas. The intent was not to gather alarm rate data, hence, no quantitative results are presented.

For simulation purposes, it was postulated that a pilot desiring to transit the geographical airspace outside the TCA from "A to B" without communicating with the control facility would only deviate from the intended track sufficiently to avoid the physical boundaries of the TCA. Depending upon the altitude of the flights, which in most cases are low performance aircraft, this tends to constrict the uncontrolled aircraft to areas below the floors of the TCA or in a narrowband outside the TCA (figure 9). Even though this is normal procedure for uncontrolled aircraft today, it is conceivable that TCA's might not exist when all aircraft have collision avoidance systems (CAS). Moreover, even in a TCA terminal environment, pilots of equipped aircraft might be less concerned about skirting a TCA with the electronic protection of ATARS.

The results of the uncontrolled test series indicated that in some cases, where conflict resolution between uncontrolled aircraft flying below the TCA involved vertical commands, aircraft were maneuvered into the supposed inviolate TCA.

Two solutions to this problem, if indeed it is a problem in light of complete ATARS protection, would be:

1. Include the TCA dimensions in the ATARS adaptation data similar to the way a restricted area would be handled to prevent a violation of such airspace.
2. Define buffer zones near a TCA to exclude uncontrolled aircraft operations. Most resolutions can be achieved within a 1-nmi horizontal or 500-foot vertical deviation. Therefore, advising or ruling that aircraft maintain these distances (a simple feat with area navigation (RNAV)) from the TCA should eliminate inadvertent entry.

From the standpoint of the controller, the major problem which was caused by the uncontrolled aircraft was the clutter produced on the display as a result of ATARS displayed data. When a controlled aircraft is in an encounter with an uncontrolled aircraft, the complete data block of the uncontrolled aircraft is forced onto the display. These data, in conjunction with the flashing

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


FIGURE 9. PHILADELPHIA TERMINAL CONTROL AREA (TCA)

vector line, tends to aggravate an already complex traffic picture. In addition, the controller, not being in communication with the uncontrolled aircraft, has no knowledge of what that aircraft might do. It might maneuver immediately to relieve the situation or it might not maneuver until the controller had initiated some instruction to the controlled aircraft and then possibly maneuver so as to negate the controller's instruction. It should be mentioned that, in these particular tests, the uniform logic concept replaced the former logic that would have caused the uncontrolled aircraft to receive an ATARS command prior to a controlled aircraft. The use of the original logic would undoubtedly have eliminated many of the controller alerts experienced in these tests.

The tests indicated that a horizontal and vertical buffer is necessary to preclude a high number of undesirable alarms between controlled aircraft operating within the TCA and uncontrolled aircraft flying in proximity to the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the TCA. Also, uncontrolled aircraft operating around TCA's and in high density terminal areas such as satellite airport environments, should receive advisories and advisory resolution prior to controlled aircraft in order that the organization of controlled aircraft not be disturbed.

NMC SPECIAL TESTS.

The primary purpose of the non-mode C runs was to highlight problems that might exist with non mode C-equipped aircraft flying in proximity to DABS-equipped aircraft which might be maneuvering in response to ATARS commands. There was concern that an aircraft responding to an ATARS command would be maneuvered into a conflict with a non-mode C aircraft for which no ATARS protection exists. Within the basic VFR traffic sample of 126 aircraft, 36 general aviation type aircraft were considered to be only mode A (non-mode C) equipped, 12 were considered to be ATCRBS mode C equipped and the remainder or 78 aircraft were DABS mode C equipped. In analyzing the individual encounters, there was no evidence to show that ATARS lack of knowledge of ATCRBS mode A aircraft introduced any hazardous situations. This is a reasonable expectation in a controlled environment with a managed traffic flow. In a more random uncontrolled environment, unequipped aircraft may pose a more serious threat to equipped aircraft being maneuvered by ATARS.

PROXIMITY ADVISORIES (PWI) ANALYSIS.

DISCUSSION. Proximity advisories are involved in all uplinks sent to aircraft to include steady PWI's, flashing PWI's, and commands all of which provide relative altitude and relative bearing of the intruder aircraft.

The proximity advisory data was analyzed to determine: how often a typical aircraft experienced traffic advisories, how long the advisories lasted, how many were received at one time, and the geometry of the encounter; e.g., head-on or tail chase. Only the data for PSI and PSIV are included, since these series most resemble the Philadelphia IFR and mixed IFR/VFR TCA controlled aircraft environments, respectively. Uncontrolled aircraft were not included in these tests. Undoubtedly, proximity advisory rates would have been higher,

had a valid uncontrolled traffic scenario existed and been included in the traffic scenarios. These data are an initial estimate of proximity advisory activity in a fully equipped DABS/ATARS environment and reflect what the distribution might be in a controlled TCA environment.

ATARS INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT EFFECT.


There was an average of 101 ordinary PWI (OPWI) encounters per hour in the PSI series and 144 encounters per hour in the PSIV series in which at least one PWI advisory was issued to both aircraft. As can be seen from table 8, a typical aircraft under IFR operations was involved in about 1.7 encounters per hour, and under mixed IFR/VFR operations in 2.4 encounters per hour. The closer proximity of aircraft under VFR operations results in increased OPWI activity. Advisories lasted approximately 48 seconds for both the PSI and PSIV encounters.

TABLE 8. PWI ENCOUNTER SUMMARY

Series	Average Number of Active Aircraft Per Hour	Average Number of OPWI Paired Encounters Per Hour	Average Number of Encounters Per Aircraft	Average Encounters Duration (Seconds)
PSI	115.8	100.8	1.7	47.2
PSIV	120.0	143.5	2.4	49.2

In order to characterize the level of OPWI activity a pilot might experience in the cockpit, the data were broken down into the number and duration of lights lit on the IPC (BADCOM) display. The BADCOM, figure 10, is a candidate cockpit display which displays PWI advisories and negative and positive commands to a pilot. The 12 sets of three lights on the outer ring of the display are used to indicate the relative bearing (at 30° intervals) and relative altitude, above, below, or coaltitude (+,-500 feet) of an intruder aircraft. A red X instructs the pilot not to maneuver in that direction and a green arrow directs the pilot to execute a maneuver in the direction and dimension specified.

Table 9 presents data on the number of proximity advisory lights lit on the display at any one time and the average duration of these lights. The table lists the number of aircraft that had exactly n lights lit simultaneously, where n=1, 2, 3, 4. A single aircraft in which one light was lit for five scans, two lights lit simultaneously for an additional five scans, and three lights lit simultaneously for an extra six scans, would have a 1 added to each of the totals for n=1, 2, and 3 lights lit. The numbers represent averages over the four runs of each series. Thus, in the PSIV runs, there was an hourly average of 35 aircraft in which the pilot had two lights on his BADCOM display lit simultaneously for an average duration of 36 seconds (nine scans). The maximum number of multiple lights lit simultaneously on a single aircraft was four. This happened to only one aircraft and lasted for three scans.



79-33-10

FIGURE 10. BADCOM DISPLAY

TABLE 9. AIRCRAFT PROXIMITY ADVISORIES HOURLY RATE
(PILOT DISPLAY VIEWPOINT)

Series	Number of Active Aircraft	Average Flight Duration Minutes and Seconds	Simultaneous Proximity Advisories No. of Aircraft (No. of 4-Sec. Scans)			
			1	2	3	4
PSI	115.8	14.54	84.8(27)*	19.5(9)	0.5(3)	—
PSIV	120.0	13.47	102.4(28)	35 (9)	6 (4)	0.3(3)

*Numbers in parenthesis represent average duration in 4-sec. scans.


Over many flights in the environment, an aircraft would on the average have one or more OPWI's displayed 9.8 percent of its flight time in the PSI series and 13.2 percent in the PSIV series. In only a small percentage of flight time, 0.7 percent for PSI and 1.4 percent for PSIV, were 2 or more lights simultaneously lit.

An analysis was made of the relative position of aircraft at the start of an encounter to determine whether the aircraft were diverging in a tail-chase or flying head-on. These situations were defined by the relative bearing of each aircraft from one to another during an encounter. If paired aircraft viewed each other at the 8 o'clock through 4 o'clock relative bearing, this was considered a head-on encounter. If the lead aircraft showed the intruder to be in the 5 o'clock through 7 o'clock bearing and the following aircraft displayed the lead aircraft at the 8 o'clock through 4 o'clock bearing, the encounter was a tail-chase. A diverging encounter existed when both aircraft were in the 5 o'clock through 7 o'clock bearing relative to each other. Figure 11 defines the three encounter situations by clock positions of the bearing of each aircraft relative one to another. Table 10 shows the percentage of total encounters that were head-on, tail-chase, or diverging. In less than 1 percent of the encounters were the aircraft diverging, a significant portion, roughly 71 percent, were encounters in which the intruder was within a bearing from 8 o'clock to 4 o'clock relative to its own aircraft. The remaining encounters, approximately 28 percent, were tail-chase situations. It can also be seen that the average horizontal separation between aircraft at the start of an encounter was 2.5 nmi over all encounters.


TABLE 10. GEOMETRY AT START OF ENCOUNTER

Series	Percent Head-On	Percent Tail Chase	Percent Diverging	Average Range Between Aircraft (nmi)
PSI	66.5	33.5	0.0	2.5
PSIV	75.8	23.3	0.9	2.5


AIRCRAFT A




AIRCRAFT B




HEAD ON



TAIL CHASE



INTRUDER PW1 APPEARS IN SHADED AREA



DIVERGING




FIGURE 11. DEFINITION OF HEAD-ON, TAIL-CHASE AND DIVERGING ENCOUNTER (PWI CLOCK POSITION)

Table 11 lists the percent of a data hour in which 0, 1, 2, —, 10, aircraft were uplinked at least one advisory within the same second. The maximum number of aircraft sent an uplink during any 1 second was 10. As can be seen, there were no aircraft sent (X = 0 column) an uplink 60 percent of the time in the PSIV series and 66 percent of the time in the PSI series.

TABLE 11. PERCENT OF HOUR WITH X AIRCRAFT BEING UPLINKED ADVISORIES

SERIES	<u>X =</u>										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
PSI	66.1	10.8	15.2	3.3	3.0	1.1	0.4	0.1	—	—	—
PSIV	60.8	7.7	18.5	5.3	4.3	1.7	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results of the simulation tests, it is concluded that:

1. ATARS had no impact on the controllers or control procedures. Operations rates were consistently high, and no serious violation of ATC separation criteria occurred. Controllers used standard ATC control procedures and no increase in separation between aircraft was required to accommodate ATARS. The display of ATARS data to the controller did, however, introduce objectionable display clutter when uncontrolled aircraft were in encounters with controlled aircraft. The use of identical threat thresholds for both categories of aircraft, coupled with insufficient information regarding the intent of the uncontrolled aircraft, created a confusing display of flashing data blocks.
2. A further reduction of the Philadelphia main airport ATARS desensitization zones is warranted. The desensitization zone used in this study extended from the runway out to the outer marker. The results show that the length of this zone can be reduced to about half that and still eliminate virtually all undesirable ATARS alarms between arrival aircraft on converging ILS courses and between arrival aircraft and airport surface traffic.
3. Further studies are required to determine the need for ATARS desensitization at satellite airports. Two major factors to be considered are (1) the type of ATC service provided at the airport, and (2) the volume of traffic to be serviced. Under conditions of minimum ATC coverage and low density traffic at satellite airports, ATARS may provide a very effective separation assurance system without desensitization at the expense of only a few undesirable alarms.
4. ATARS provided adequate resolution to conflicting aircraft. ATARS detected all instances of potential conflict and provided resolution advisories to adequately separate aircraft.

5. The positive command rates were low under both IFR and VFR flight procedures. An average of only 0.5 encounters per hour involved positive commands. No positive commands were issued to aircraft inside the TCA.

6. ATARS advisories generated in the Philadelphia environment are primarily caused by the crossing route structure generated by the satellite airport traffic outside the TCA. All the command encounters except one occurred outside the TCA and involved at least one satellite aircraft. The one exception was from the PIV series in which no satellite aircraft were simulated and involved the use of VFR separation criteria.

7. A horizontal and vertical buffer is necessary to preclude a high number of undesirable alarms between controlled aircraft operating within the TCA and uncontrolled aircraft flying near the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the TCA. Without regulatory action to prevent uncontrolled aircraft from flying immediately at the boundaries of TCA's, ATRAS commands will inevitably cause some of these aircraft to penetrate TCA's.

8. Vertical tracker lag triggers advisories and/or continues them unnecessarily in cases where aircraft are leveling off above another aircraft. Although it was not apparent in any of the command encounters, tracker lag was responsible for seven of the thirteen encounters where only threat advisories were generated.

9. Although convergence/divergence logic did not significantly reduce alarm levels, it did shorten the duration of some command encounters. Four of the command encounters would have been reduced in duration by one or two command scans had the convergence/divergence filter been used. This filter eliminates alarms in circumstances where aircraft are violating ATARS alarm thresholds but are projected to be diverging in one dimension when at the closest point of approach in the other dimension.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The horizontal dimensions of the Philadelphia ATARS desensitization zones should be reduced so that they only extend to 2.0 nautical miles (nmi) from the threshold of the respective runways rather than all the way to the outer markers.

2. Allow uncontrolled aircraft operating around terminal control areas (TCA's) and in high density terminal areas, such as satellite airport environments, to receive threat and resolution advisories prior to controlled aircraft in order that the organization of controlled aircraft not be disturbed.

3. Some form of convergence/divergence logic should be incorporated into all future versions of the Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS) algorithm. This logic looks at both the horizontal and vertical dimensions simultaneously to prohibit the generation of resolution advisories when the aircraft are projected to be in conflict in one dimension, but clearing in the other.

4. Investigate the possibility of reducing tracker lag by improving turn and climb/descent/level-off detection.

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2. Windle J., Morfitt G., Devine P., Rossiter S., and Fillius A., ATARS/ATC Simulation Tests with Site-Adaptation Logic, Report No. FAA-RD-78-138, January 1979.
3. McFarland, A. L., Patel, K. R., and Roberts, D. L., Multi-Site Intermittent Positive Control Algorithm for the Discrete Address Beacon System, Report No. FAA-EM-74-4, Change 2, May 1976.
4. IPC Site Adaptation Logic for DSF Testing, MITRE Corporation Memorandum to Dan Hopson, ARD-250, from Chen-Chung Hsin, August 8, 1977.

APPENDIX A
ATARS/PHILADELPHIA TRAFFIC

The construction of the traffic samples was based on an analysis of flight progress strips obtained from the Philadelphia TRACON. These strips were for 4 days of the first 6 months of 1977, during which the daily strip count ranged from 1,665 to 2,040. Further breakdown of this daily traffic to the busiest 16 hours provided a distribution of traffic by user, aircraft type, flight status, arrival/departure, and airport of operation.

Not all of the information for the VFR flights were available on the flight progress strips. Some operational interpretation and liberties were taken with this traffic. The controller, in most cases, handwrites a strip for VFR aircraft when they contact the facility for TCA entry clearance. This strip generally only indicates what instructions the controller issues and contains no preentry route data. Additionally, the Philadelphia TCA has no specific entry fixes published for VFR aircraft. The entry points used for these traffic samples, in general, conform to the normal IFR traffic flow without purposely mixing with that flow and reflect a consideration for the level of experience to be found in Philadelphia pilots.

Six different series of tests were designed to investigate the source and level of ATARS activity that might be expected to occur in the Philadelphia terminal area. These series are called PI, PIV, PSI, PSIV, NMC, and UNC. Five similar, but different, traffic samples were built for each series. One sample was used for training and four were used for data collection. The traffic samples used in each series of runs are summarized in tables A-1 through A-4. Table A-1 shows the total number of aircraft simulated in each series. The Philadelphia core traffic used in all data runs consisted of 75 aircraft of which 25 were general aviation (GA), 18 were air taxi (AT), and 32 were air carrier (AC).

TABLE A-1. TRAFFIC SAMPLE COUNTS

SERIES	<u>AIRPORT</u>		<u>OVERFLIGHTS</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>PHL</u>	<u>SAT</u>	<u>CONTROLLED</u>	<u>UNC</u>	
PI	75	0	0	0	75
PIV	75	0	0	0	75
PSI	75	42	2	0	119
PSIV	75	42	9	0	126
NMC	75	42	9	0	126
UNC	75	42	9	25	151

TEST SERIES PI.

This series simulated the Philadelphia airport in an IFR situation. The runway configuration was easterly and only one runway (09R) was used for arrival operations. A parallel runway (09L) was used for high performance departure aircraft. Low performance aircraft were permitted to depart on runway 17. All 75 aircraft were flown under IFR separation criteria.

TEST SERIES PIV.

This series simulated the Philadelphia airport in a VFR situation with landings on runways 17 and 27R and departures on runways 17 and 27L. The traffic volume for this series was 75 operations per hour. Separation criteria applied between VFR/VFR aircraft and VFR/IFR aircraft was 1.5 nmi horizontal or 500 feet vertical. It was assumed that 50 percent of general aviation and air taxi operations were operating on VFR flight plans. The flight rule by aircraft user breakdown is shown in table A-2.

TABLE A-2. PHILADELPHIA IFR/VFR AIRPORT TRAFFIC

USER	FLT RULE	VFR	IFR	TOTAL
General Aviation		13	12	25
Air Taxi		9	9	18
Air Carrier		0	32	32
Total		22	53	75

TEST SERIES PSI.

In series PI and PIV only the 75 aircraft were simulated. The PSI series introduced satellite operations to the environment and required additional controllers and increased coordination. As in series PI, all aircraft were considered to be operating in IFR conditions. Standard ATC separation criteria of at least 3 nmi horizontal or 1,000 feet vertical were applied between aircraft. The volume of aircraft was increased to 119 aircraft and included satellite operations and two overflights. The breakdown of the 42 satellite aircraft by airport, type, and flight rule is presented in table A-3.

TABLE A-3. SATELLITE AIRPORT TRAFFIC

AIRPORT	GA	AT	MIL	TOTAL	IFR	VFR
Greater Wilmington (ILG)	11	4	0	15	5	10
North Philadelphia (PNE)	8	4	0	12	6	6
Trenton (TTN)	5	3	0	8	6	2
Willowgrove (NXX)	0	0	5	5	5	0
Coatsville (CVE)	2	0	0	—	2	0
Total	26	11	5	42	24	18

TEST SERIES PSIV.

This series is identical to the PSI series, except that seven VFR overflights are added for a total of 126 aircraft and VFR separation criteria is used where appropriate.

TEST SERIES NMC.

This series was established to vary the ATARS equipment capability of the participating aircraft. It used the same traffic as in the PSI series plus seven VFR overflights for a total of 126 aircraft. In tests PI, PIV, and PSI all aircraft were assumed to have DABS equipment with displays to accept ATARS PWI and resolution data. ATARS does not process data on aircraft without mode C altitude encoding capability, and in the initial period of ATARS implementation there is liable to be a considerable percentage of unequipped aircraft. The intent of this series was to determine what problems could be encountered in an environment of equipped and unequipped aircraft.

The distribution of ATCRBS mode A, ATCRBS mode C, and DABS was based on estimates of aircraft equipage for the 1980 time period obtained from SRDS DABS briefing material. For the purposes of this test series, it was assumed that all air carrier and scheduled air taxi flights would be equipped with DABS/ATARS equipment. For the general aviation population, it was assumed that 60 percent of the general aviation fleet would not have mode C altitude encoders. Of the 40 percent with mode C, it was decided that one-half might have complete DABS/ATARS and one-half ATCRBS mode C only. Table A-4 presents the aircraft equipage for the NMC series.

TABLE A-4. NMC SERIES AIRCRAFT EQUIPAGE

AIRPORT	AIR CARRIER	AIR TAXI/MIL	GENERAL AVIATION			TOTAL ATCRBS
	DABS	DABS	DABS	MODE A	ATCRBS MODE C	
PHL	32	18	5	15	5	75
ILG	0	4	2	7	2	15
PNE	0	4	2	4	2	12
TTN	0	3	1	3	1	8
NXX	0	5(mil)	0	0	0	5
CVE	0	0	0	2	0	2
OVERFLTS	0	0	2	5	2	9
TOTAL	32	34	12	36	12	126

TEST SERIES UNC.

This series was designed to investigate the impact of uncontrolled aircraft operating in close proximity both horizontally and vertically to the TCA. The construction of the traffic sample was based on information gleaned from VFR flight plans obtained from the North Philadelphia Flight Service Station. This was the only available source of information short of a full-blown airport-by-airport interview of pilots. Since the requirement for filing a VFR flight plan is not mandatory, but only good operating practice, there was no guarantee that the flight plans obtained were completely representative. In fact, the filing of a VFR flight plan does not indicate uncontrolled flight but merely an intent to fly clear of clouds. Consequently, the uncontrolled aircraft in the UNC series present a combination of fact and postulation as to how a pilot might circumnavigate a TCA while maintaining his planned direction of flight.

The volume of traffic was the same as the NMC series except that 25 uncontrolled flights were added. The controller had no ability to communicate with these aircraft. All aircraft were DABS equipped, and the uncontrolled flights responded automatically to ATARS commands. When commands to an uncontrolled flight were discontinued, the aircraft was programmed to return to its original flightpath in the most appropriate manner.

APPENDIX B
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ATARS ALGORITHM

The ATARS algorithm used in the simulation could generate four types of messages for delivery to the pilot and one message type for delivery to the controller. These messages are described as follows:

1. Proximity advisory or ordinary proximity warning indicator (OPWI).

Informs the pilot that another aircraft is nearby but not on a collision course. The intruder's relative bearing is depicted within a 30° relative bearing sector and relative altitude is indicated as above, below, or within 500 feet of its own altitude.

2. Threat advisory or flashing proximity warning indicator (FPWI).

Informs the pilot of a potential conflict and that a command may be issued if the present condition persists. It also contains the data provided by the OPWI.

3. Negative resolution advisory or negative command.

Negative commands may be effective or non-effective. An effective negative command requires the pilot to take action and stop an existing horizontal or vertical maneuver. A non-effective negative command informs the pilot that his present flightpath is safe, but that a conflict would develop if he were to maneuver in the indicated direction. Four negative advisories were provided, "do not turn left," "do not turn right," "do not descend," and "do not climb." Negative commands were always accompanied by an FPWI.

4. Positive resolution advisory or positive command.

Informs the pilot that a conflict exists which must be resolved by a maneuver. Four positive commands were provided, "turn right," "turn left," "climb," and "descend." Positive advisories were always accompanied by an FPWI.

5. Controller Alert.

The controller is provided with an alert whenever an FPWI, negative or positive advisory is issued to a pilot. The alert consists of a blinking character, in the third line of the aircraft's data block, which indicates the advisory being uplinked to the aircraft.

An aircraft can receive multiple threat and multiple resolution advisories; i.e., a pilot could receive positive horizontal and positive vertical advisories simultaneously.

The ATARS detection algorithm is described below in terms of the conditions required to generate each of the preceding messages.

1. OPWI's are issued to both aircraft whenever the altitude separation (ALT) and range separation (RANGE) between the two aircraft satisfy the following:

$$\text{ALT} < 2000 \text{ feet}$$

and $\text{RANGE} < \sqrt{2(v_1^2 + v_2^2)} \cdot 30 \text{ sec or Range } 2 \text{ nmi}$

where v_1 and v_2 are the speed of the two aircraft expressed in nmi/sec

2. FPWI's are issued to both aircraft whenever the following three conditions are satisfied:

- a. Time to closest approach in the horizontal dimension (T_H or horizontal tau) < 45 sec;

where,

$$T_H = -\frac{R - DSQ/R}{R'}$$

R = Range separation
R' = Rate of change of Range
DSQ = ADET $(v_1^2 + v_2^2)$ + BDET
ADET = 7.5 sec²
BDET = 0.025 nmi²

- b. T_V (vertical tau) < 45 sec or ALT $< 900'$

where:

$$T_V = \frac{(Z_2 - Z_1)}{Z_2 - Z_1}$$

Z_2 , Z_1 = altitudes of AC 2 and 1, respectively
 Z_2' , Z_1' = altitudes rates of AC 2 and 1, respectively

- c. Horizontal Miss Distance (MD) < 1 nmi

3. Negative commands are issued to both aircraft whenever the following three conditions are satisfied:

- a. $T_H < 30$ sec
- b. $T_V < 30$ sec or ALT $< 900'$
- c. MD < 1 nmi

4. Positive commands are issued to both aircraft whenever the following three conditions are satisfied:

- a. $T_H < 30$ sec
- b. $T_V < 30$ sec or ALT < 470 feet
- c. MD $< .5$ nmi

5. Controller alerts are issued to the appropriate ATC facility whenever the criteria for a FPWI are satisfied for a controlled aircraft. A listing of significant system parameters used in the algorithm are presented in table B-1.

TABLE B-1. PARAMETER VALUES

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Value</u>
ADET	7.5 sec ²
AFCONI	470.0 ft
AFIFR	900.0 ft
BDET	0.025 nmi ²
MDTHF2	4.0 nmi ²
TCONT	45.0 sec
TL6	30.0 sec
TL11	45.0 sec
TL15	30.0 sec
TL16	45.0 sec

The parameters listed in table B-1 are defined as follows:

ADET, BDET--parameters used in the horizontal modified tau calculation,
AFCONI--altitude threshold for a controller alert in an IFR/IFR conflict,
AFIFR--altitude threshold for issuing a flashing PWI to an IFR aircraft,
MDTHF2--square of the projected miss distance threshold for issuing an FPWI,
TCONT--controller alert look-ahead time in the terminal area,
TL11--look-ahead time for issuing a flashing PWI when one aircraft is unequipped,
TL16--look-ahead time for issuing a flashing PWI when both aircraft are equipped,
TL6--look-ahead time for issuing an ATARS command when one aircraft is un-
equipped, and
TL15--look-ahead time for issuing an ATARS command when both aircraft are
equipped.

APPENDIX C

ATARS COMMAND ENCOUNTERS

This appendix presents plots and descriptions of the nine ATARS encounters (one in PIV, four in PSI, and four in PSIV series), which resulted in positive or negative commands. Two plots are included for each encounter. One presents the encounter's horizontal profile and the second shows the encounter's vertical profile. Both axes of the horizontal plots are in nautical miles measured from the location of the radar. At Philadelphia, the radar is located just south of the threshold end of runway 09R. The aircraft identifications denote the starting locations of their respective tracks. The plus (+) symbol on an aircraft's track indicates the aircraft's actual position as recorded by the air traffic control simulation facility (ATCSF). The aircrafts' heading, as calculated by the ATARS algorithm, is shown by a straight line that emanates from the current position of the aircraft as perceived by the ATARS algorithm. The horizontal profile plots list the values of the closest point of approach in the horizontal plane (CPAH) in nmi, in the vertical plane (CPAV) in feet, and the slant range (SCPA) in nmi. The horizontal (SCPAH) and vertical (SCPAV) separations at the scan of minimum SCPA are also listed. For each scan of an encounter, the following information is printed: A symbol indicating the advisory issued to an aircraft; i.e., proximity (S for steady PWI) threat (F for FPWI), or resolution (negative and positive resolution advisories); the horizontal (TH) and vertical (TV) times to collision; the horizontal range between aircraft (range); the projected miss distance (MD); and the vertical separation (DZ).

The vertical profile plot uses time and altitude for its axes. The aircraft identifications, plus symbols, indicate the mode C altitude quantized in 100-foot increments. The position coordinates; i.e., X, Y, and Z, and heading (HDG) of each aircraft when the first threat advisory (FPWI) is generated are listed on the right side of the plot. For each scan of the encounter the following information is tabulated: the control status of each aircraft; i.e., controlled (C) or uncontrolled (U) horizontal velocity of each aircraft in knots and relative vertical velocity (VRZ) in feet/minutes. The issuance of a controller alert is indicated on both plots by an asterisk beside the appropriate scan number.

ENCOUNTER NO. 1 - PIV-2.

N3929L, a VFR departure climbing to 2,000 feet, and N3352U, a VFR arrival descending to 2,000 feet, momentarily triggered a two-scan FPWI after their horizontal paths had crossed but projected miss distance was within 1 nmi.

ENCOUNTER NO. 2 - PSI-1.

N7422A, an IFR departure from Philadelphia, was controlled by the north departure position. BLT721, an IFR departure from Newcastle, was controlled by the north satellite position. The aircraft were at coaltitude and converging in the horizontal plane when a controller alert was issued by ATARS. To prevent BLT721 from crossing in front of N7422A, the north satellite controller

turned BLT721 to the right so he would pass behind N7422A. The turn command "fly heading 120" was issued on the first "no left" command issued by the algorithm. The north departure controller issued a "descend and maintain 6,000" command to N7422A on the third FPWI.

When the first "no left" command was uplinked by ATARS, N7422A had crossed the projected path of BLT721 and had started to descend. Although the aircraft were still converging horizontally, the projected miss-distance and altitude separation were both increasing. The closest projected miss-distance, 0.93 nmi, occurred on the third FPWI. The aircraft came within 1.3 nmi and 190 feet on the last scan of "no left" commands. The violation of ATC separation standards was attributed to controller coordination problems.

ENCOUNTER NO. 3 - PSI-2.

N6101, an IFR Newcastle arrival, was level at 4,000 feet flying a heading of 180°. N7864K, an overflight having descended from 4,000, was level at 3,000 feet also on a heading of 180°. The north approach controller instructed N7864K to "climb and maintain 6,000, fly heading 240" which caused N7864K to follow a collision course with N6101. On scan 896 control of N6101 was transferred from the north satellite controller to the south departure controller. Two scans later, scan 898, FPWI's were issued to both aircraft. The aircraft continued to converge in both dimensions until ATARS issued climb commands to N6101 and dive commands to N7864K and the aircraft responded to the commands. Minimum projected miss-distance during the 10-scan encounter was 0.28 nmi. At the end of the encounter the aircraft were separated by 0.34 nmi, and 468 feet. When the first vertical command was uplinked, the aircraft were separated by 1.51 nmi, and 380 feet. Violation of ATC separation standards was attributed to controller coordination problems and ATARS issued an appropriate resolution maneuver to separate the aircraft.

ENCOUNTER NO. 4 - PSI-4.

N7763T, an IFR arrival to Newcastle, and N6528N, an IFR departure from Newcastle, were involved in an encounter which resulted in eight scans of FPWI's and one scan of a "no left" command. Both aircraft were controlled by the south departure position. At the time of the conflict, N5528N was climbing to 5,000 feet at maximum rate and N7763T had leveled off at 3,000 feet. They were flying headings of 270 and 180°, respectively. The aircraft were diverging in the vertical plane after the second scan of FPWI when the horizontal separation was 1.91 nmi.

ENCOUNTER NO. 5 - PSI-7.

N8781U, an IFR departure from North Philadelphia, and V48211, an IFR arrival to NXX, were at coaltitude and converging horizontally at about a 90° crossing angle when the ATARS was triggered. Both aircraft were controlled by the North satellite position. The aircraft were converging until horizontal separation was 1.28 nmi at which time they started to diverge vertically.

ENCOUNTER NO. 6 - PSIV-1.

N75500, a VFR arrival to Trenton (TTN) had been cleared for an ILS approach to runway 7, level at 1,500 feet, and was flying a heading of 090°. RAN557, a VFR arrival to North Philadelphia (PNE) had been cleared for an ILS approach to runway 24, was descending through the altitude of N75500, and was flying a heading of 240°. When the first negative right command was generated, the aircraft were separated by 2.46 nmi and 70 feet. Closest point of approach was 1.75 nmi. When the two aircraft received the negative commands, they both executed missed approaches and started to climb.

ENCOUNTER NO. 7 - PSIV-2.

N3029, a VFR departure from Newcastle (ILG) was level at 3,500 feet on a heading of 010°. N3305V, a VFR arrival to Newcastle (ILG) was descending to 3,500 feet on a heading of 160°. At the time the FPWI's were uplinked, the aircraft were coaltitude at 3,500 feet and converging horizontally. When the fourth of five FPWI's was uplinked, the aircraft were at coaltitude and separated by 2.6 nmi. It was at this time, scan 790, that the departure controller, who was controlling both aircraft, instructed N3305V to fly heading 270° and descend to 2,500 feet at its maximum rate. The ATARS uplinked positive vertical commands to the aircraft on scan 792. The ATARS command to N3305V was completely opposite to the controller's instructions. That is, the ATARS issued a climb command to N3305V, whereas the controller had issued a dive command. The ATCSF/ATARS was designed to allow the controller instruction to take precedence over the ATARS command.

ENCOUNTER NO. 8 - PSIV-5.


N9206, a VFR arrival to runway 17 at Philadelphia was flying on a heading of 350°. N5223N, a VFR through flight, was on an intercepting heading of 080°. Both aircraft were at a coaltitude of 3,500 feet. ATARS uplinked FPWI's to both aircraft starting on scan 639. On scan 641, as the third FPWI was being uplinked, the TCA controller instructed N9206 to descend and maintain 2,500 feet. After uplinking 5 scans of FPWI's, ATARS started uplinking 4 scans of positive vertical commands. The aircraft had started to diverge vertically because of the TCA controller instructions when the first positive command was uplinked.

ENCOUNTER NO. 9 - PSIV-7.

N3087V, a VFR approach to Newcastle (ILS), was level at 6,500 feet on a heading of 210°. TW118, an IFR approach to runway 27R at Philadelphia, was descending to 7,000 feet on a heading of 100°. As TW118 leveled off, the alarm was sounded. Vertical tracker lag was responsible for the alarm. No ATC violation had occurred. At closest point of approach, the aircraft were separated by 0.58 nmi and 503 feet.

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ENCOUNTER NUMBER 1 PIV-2




PNT/PLT P02 PIV1 11 JUL 78 AC1 N3352U AC2 N3352U ATARS SAMPLE : ATARS PNL TEST
 ATARS VERS. 4TRC-4.5 NPTEC VERSION 2.0

1 728

74

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MPTS FT AC1 = 45 MPTS FT AC2 = 45


ENCOUNTER NUMBER 1 PIV-2



PIV-2 PIV-11 JUL 79 AC1 N3352U AC2 N3929L ATARS SAMPLE : ATARS PNL TEST
ATARS VERS. NTAC-4.5 MMFEC VERSION 2.0
924 164 97 1811 -1460 -32 9679
925 162 97 1795 -208 -211 9679
926 179 90 -672 111 9679
927 174 91 -572 176 9679

START TIME = 10 47 49 END TIME = 10 49 9 ST SCAN = 993 END SCAN = 303
 NPTS FT AC1 = 21 NPTS FT AC2 = 21

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 2 PSI-1



CPMH = 1.179 CPNAV = 1.000

POSIND = C AT SCAN 0 HDG = 0.000
 ALT = C C XHDG = 0.00

CPA ON SCAN 696 SCPA = 1.179
 SCPAH = 1.179 SCPAV = 280.978

AC1 ID = 0-TT721 CDM D555

AC2 ID = N7422R CDM D555


SCAN	AC1	AC2	POS	TH	RANGE	HDG	TV	RZ
992			59	5.63	1.00	0.0	0.0	0.0
994	S	F	59	5.21	0.99	0.0	0.0	0.0
995	S	F	46	4.93	0.97	0.0	0.0	0.0
996	S	F	45	4.41	0.91	0.0	0.0	0.0
997	S	F	41	4.02	0.95	0.0	0.0	0.0
998	S	F	38	3.62	0.91	0.0	0.0	0.0
999	F	F	36	3.27	0.91	0.0	0.0	0.0
990	F	F	39	2.89	0.93	0.0	0.0	0.0
991	F	F	27	2.43	0.86	0.0	0.0	0.0
992	F	F	26	2.19	0.86	-1.0	-1.6	-1.9
993	NL	NL	0	0.32	1.04	0.97	-1.8	-1.7
994	NL	NL	0	0	1.5	1.07	-1.7	-1.6
995	NL	NL	0	0	1.35	1.04	-2.0	-1.9
996	S	S	96	1.18	1.07	-2.2	-2.1	-2.0
997	S	S	957	1.29	0.99	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0
998	S	S	933	1.65	0.92	-3.8	-3.7	-3.4
999	S	S	999	1.91	0.90	-3.3	-3.3	-3.1
300	S	S	999	2.30	0.90	-3.5	-3.5	-3.5
301	S	S	999	2.71	0.92	-3.7	-3.7	-3.6
302	S	S	999	3.12	0.90	-3.6	-3.6	-3.6
303	S	S	999	3.49	0.90	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0

1

PNT/PNT ATAMS 4 JUN 79 AC1 BLT721 AC2 N7422R ATAMS SAMPLE 1 PNL P010 PSI-1
 MMFEC VERSION 2.0
 ATAMS VERS. MMFAC-4.5

START TIME = 10 47 42 END TIME = 10 49 3 ST SCAN = 995 END SCAN = 103
 NPTS FT RC1 = 21 NPTS FT RC2 = 21

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 2 PSI-1



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
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 TIME (HH:MM:SS)

PRT/P LT STARS 4 JUN 79 RC1 5 T721 RC2 N7422A ATARS SAMPLE : THI P310 PSI-1
 ATARS VERS. MTRAC-4.5 MAFEC VERSION 2.0

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NPTS FT AC1 = 42 NPTS FT AC2 = 42

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 3 PSI-2



SCAN	AC1	AC2	POS	TH	RANGE	HD	TV	RZ
971	S	S	118	1.33	0.89	-24	-516	
972	S	S	111	2.86	0.85	-27	-679	
973	S	S	123	1.70	0.90	-31	-789	
974	S	S	36	0.53	0.99	-34	-816	
975	S	S	94	2.43	1.11	-39	-1000	
976	S	S	31	2.10	0.90	-47	-1056	
977	S	S	111	2.41	0.93	-63	-1078	
978	S	S	399	2.43	0.92	-91	-1078	
979	S	S	999	2.37	0.92	-146	-1067	
980	S	S	999	2.68	0.92	-276	-1051	
981	S	S	999	2.71	0.92	-733	-1035	
982	S	S	399	2.32	0.92	99	-1022	
983	S	S	999	2.11	0.92	99	-1012	
984	S	S	999	3.33	0.92	99	-1024	
985	S	S	999	3.51	0.92	959	-1020	
986	S	S	999	3.72	0.92	999	-997	
987	S	S	999	3.81	0.92	999	-995	
988	F	F	146	3.85	0.92	98	-853	
989	F	F	55	3.6	0.92	67	-859	
990	F	F	62	3.3	0.92	62	-799	
991	F	F	52	3.14	0.92	60	-896	
992	F	F	46	3.05	0.92	47	-826	
993	F	F	39	2.86	0.92	47	-895	
994	F	F	36	2.67	0.92	38	-519	
995	F	F	30	2.04	0.92	39	-417	
996	F	F	25	1.77	0.92	31	-363	
997	F	F	21	1.51	0.92	31	-300	
998	F	F	17	1.23	0.92	24	-317	
999	F	F	13	0.96	0.92	23	-290	
1000	F	F	9	0.71	0.92	23	-291	
1001	F	F	6	0.43	0.92	23	-291	
1002	C	C	3	0.21	0.92	23	-291	
1003	C	C	1	0.01	0.92	23	-291	
1004	C	C	-2	-0.21	0.92	23	-291	
1005	C	C	1	0.21	0.92	23	-291	
1006	C	C	3	0.43	0.92	23	-291	
1007	C	C	5	0.65	0.92	23	-291	
1008	C	C	9	0.86	0.92	23	-291	
1009	C	C	13	1.07	0.92	23	-291	
1010	C	C	1	0.01	0.92	23	-291	
1011	C	C	-2	-0.21	0.92	23	-291	
1012	C	C	1	0.21	0.92	23	-291	
1013	C	C	3	0.43	0.92	23	-291	
1014	C	C	5	0.65	0.92	23	-291	

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START TIME = 10:47:11 END TIME = 10:49:31 ST SCAN = 871 END SCAN = 0
NPTS FT RC1 = 42 NPTS FT RC2 = 42

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 3 PSI-2

FIRST FLASHING ON SCAN 998

RC1 ID = NS101 CON DABBS


X = -22.54 Y = 5.33

Z = 4003 Hdg = 179

RC2 ID = 47864K CON DABBS

X = -21.22 Y = 3.77

Z = 3519 Hdg = 239



TIME (HH:MM:SS)

PNT/PNT ATARS 4 JUN79 RC1 NO:01

RC2 N7854K ATARS SAMPLE : PHL PD10 PG1-1

ATARS VERS. MTAC-4.5

IMFEC VERSION 2.0

START TIME = 10 36 62 END TIME = 10 37 20 ST SCAN = 703 END SCAN = 725
NPTS FT AC1 = 23 AC2 = 23


ENCOUNTER NUMBER 4 PSI-4

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SCRN	AC1	AC2	MOS	TH	RNGDE	HD	TV	RZ
703			51	2.92	0.84	14	-163	
704			47	2.69	0.87	9	-105	
705			45	2.63	0.87	8	-75	
706			41	2.25	0.86	9	-68	
707 F	F		39	2.08	0.89	2	-20	
708 F	F		38	1.91	0.86	-1	6	
709 F	F		33	1.68	0.84	-7	69	
710 F	F		31	1.53	0.81	-10	108	
711 F	F	" ²	30	1.31	0.84	-15	125	
712 F	F	0	29	1.15	0.84	-18	175	
713 NL	NL		30	0.98	0.83	-23	205	
714 F	F		44	0.89	0.84	-24	271	
715 F	F		131	0.85	0.99	-29	309	
716 S	S		248	0.86	0.99	-37	327	
717 S	S		306	0.91	0.99	-37	386	
718 S	S		393	1.08	0.99	-44	411	
719 S	S		522	1.22	0.99	-42	472	
720 S	S		723	1.44	0.99	-48	539	
721 S	S		903	1.60	0.99	-60	526	
722 S	S		999	1.85	0.99	-57	580	
723 S	S		999	2.02	0.99	-65	611	
724 S	S		999	2.22	0.99	-60	672	
725 S	S		999	2.40	0.99	-67	709	

PT/PNT STARS 4 JUN 79 AC1 N7763T AC2 N652BN ATARS SAMPLE - PHM PD11 PS1-2
ATARS VERS. NTAC-4.5

-27.00 -26.00 -25.00 -24.00 -23.00 -22.00 -21.00




PNT/PNT STARS 4 JUN 79 AC1 N7763T AC2 N652BN ATARS SAMPLE - PHM PD11 PS1-2
ATARS VERS. NTAC-4.5

1

START TIME = 10:36:52 END TIME = 10:37:20 ST SCAN = 703 END SCAN = 725
 NPTS FT RC1 = 23 NPTS FT RC2 = 23

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 4 PSI-4

ALTITUDE (FEET) *10 265.00 305.00 325.00 345.00 365.00 385.00



TIME (HH:MM:SS)
 N7763T 4 JUN79 AC1 N7763T AC2 N652BN ATMS SAMPLE PHL PD11 PS1-2
 STARS VERS. NTREC-4-5 NOPEC VERSION 2-0

2

FIRST FLASHING ON SCAN 707
 RC1 ID = N7763T CON DABs
 X = -24.99 Y = -8.22
 Z = 3000 HDO = 181
 RC2 ID = N652BN CON DABs
 X = -23.40 Y = -9.56
 Z = 2980 HDO = 272

SCAN	RC1	RC2	VEL1	VEL2	VR1	VR2	DOF	TCMD
703	C	C	187	92	646	-598	30	
704	C	C	192	90	669	-549	30	
705	C	C	190	98	589	-494	30	
706	C	C	187	91	451	-444	30	
707	C	C	187	90	536	-392	30	
708	C	C	185	89	502	-341	30	
709	C	C	188	90	628	-293	30	
710	C	C	187	89	605	-251	30	
711	C	C	190	88	506	-202	30	
712	C	C	185	89	695	-169	30	
713	C	C	188	90	558	-108	30	
714	C	C	187	89	673	-61	30	
715	C	C	184	88	638	-18	30	
716	C	C	185	89	628	31	30	
717	C	C	188	89	608	64	30	
718	C	C	185	99	564	129	30	
719	C	C	183	88	675	186	30	
720	C	C	193	90	637	252	30	
721	C	C	191	91	525	292	30	
722	C	C	194	91	606	361	30	
723	C	C	193	91	-562	395	30	
724	C	C	191	90	-673	436	30	
725	C	C	189	98	-635	460	30	

C-11

START TIME = 10 26 1 END TIME = 10 29 17 ST SCAN = 5556 END SCAN = 590
NPTS FT AC1 = 35 NPTS FT AC2 = 35

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 5 PSI-7

PR/P/LT ATMS 4 JUN 79 AC1 V48211 NTC2 NO781U ATMS SAMPLE : PHL P012 PS1-3
ATMS VERS. NTC2-4.5 NTEC VERSION 2.0

NAUTICAL MILES

NAUTICAL MILES

-8.20 -6.50 -4.80 -3.10 -1.40 0.30 2

11.90 12.30 14.00 14.60 15.00 15.70 17.40

V48211


1

PHL P012 PS1-3 ATMS SAMPLE : PHL P012 PS1-3

C-12

START TIME = 10:26:1 END TIME = 10:28:17 ST SCRN = 556 END SCRN = 590
 ATMS RT RC1 = 35 ATMS RT RC2 = 35

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 5 PS1-7



FIRST FLASHING ON SCRN 572

RC1 ID = V48211 CON DRBS

X = -6.49 Y = 13.73

Z = 3988 HDO = 20

RC2 ID = N8781U CON DRBS


X = -2.46 Y = 16.93

Z = 3987 HDO = 270

SCRN	RC1	RC2	VEL1	VEL2	VRZ	DET	TCR
556	C	C	269	261	1296	-5180	30
557	C	C	268	259	1580	-4956	30
558	C	C	269	264	2369	-4717	30
559	C	C	269	263	3099	-4512	30
560	C	C	271	246	3908	-4289	30
561	C	C	269	241	4211	-4036	30
562	C	C	270	236	3983	-3917	30
563	C	C	268	236	3701	-3698	30
564	C	C	265	252	2796	-3660	30
565	C	C	264	263	1908	-3411	30
566	C	C	264	261	1167	-3220	30
567	C	C	264	262	588	-3008	30
568	C	C	266	269	189	-2801	30
569	C	C	263	261	-39	-2687	30
570	C	C	265	280	-161	-2380	30
571	C	C	265	286	-203	-2179	30
572	C	C	267	282	-196	-1980	30
573	C	C	265	280	-164	-1775	30
574	C	C	269	282	-124	-1568	30
575	C	C	270	282	-84	-1369	30
576	C	C	269	284	-61	-1160	30
577	C	C	268	264	-25	-938	30
578	C	C	255	266	-8	-728	30
579	C	C	265	286	219	-518	30
580	C	C	265	285	524	-316	30
581	C	C	264	264	1261	-102	30
582	C	C	252	264	1806	112	30
583	C	C	259	264	-2409	970	30
584	C	C	269	287	-2648	725	30
585	C	C	261	269	-2256	876	30
586	C	C	263	268	-1774	1060	30
587	C	C	264	284	-287	1270	30
588	C	C	264	284	-804	1481	30
589	C	C	264	289	-443	1868	30
590	C	C	264	289	-196	1902	30

START TIME = 17 20 42 END TIME = 10 22 38 ST SCAN = 451 END SCAN = 490
 MPTS FT RC1 = 30 MPTS FT RC2 = 30

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 6 PSIV-1



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SCAN	RC1	RC2	POS	TH	RANGE	MD	TV	RZ
451			64	10.53	1.04	995	1000	
452	S		90	10.09	1.04	999	1000	
463	S		95	9.61	0.94	993	1000	
464	S		92	9.17	1.02	969	1000	
465	S		77	8.70	0.93	265	954	
466	S		72	8.22	0.73	102	975	
467	S		69	7.82	0.97	57	775	
468	S		64	7.33	0.78	49	711	
469	S		61	6.89	0.77	39	629	
470	S		57	6.46	0.93	29	594	
471			54	6.34	0.94	23	478	
472			52	5.63	0.92	23	405	
473			49	5.22	0.93	17	919	
474			45	4.73	0.77	16	270	
475	F		41	4.35	0.55	12	202	
476	F		38	3.98	0.76	11	165	
477	F		35	3.58	0.73	7	104	
478	F		30	3.14	0.62	6	70	
479	F		29	2.90	0.77	1	10	
480	F		26	2.46	0.94	-4	-70	
481	NR	MR	0	27	2.14	1.43	-8	-117
482	S		57	1.89	1.75	-12	-140	
493	S		65	1.75	1.70	-17	-145	
494	S		393	1.75	99.00	-20	-190	
495	S		393	1.77	99.00	-36	-169	
496	S		393	1.83	99.00	-93	-145	
497	S		393	2.01	99.00	393	-129	
498	S		993	2.26	99.00	99	-114	
499	S		993	2.43	99.00	11	-131	
500	S		993	2.80	99.00	22	-67	


START TIME = 10:20:42 END TIME = 10:22:39 57 SCAN = 461 END SCAN = 490
 NPTS FT AC1 = 30 NPTS FT AC2 = 30

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 6 PSIV-1

20.00 145.00 170.00 195.00 *10 ALTITUDE (FEET) *

220.00 245.00 270.00

+ RANS557



FIRST FLASHING ON SCAN 475

AC1 ID = N7550D CON DABS

X = 12.79 Y = 16.23

Z = 1500 HDO = 91

AC2 ID = RANS557 CON DABS

X = 17.12 Y = 15.67

Z = 1702 HDO = 235

SCAN	AC1	AC2	VEL1	VEL2	VRZ	DOT	TCD
461	0	0	211	210	0	-4232	30
462	0	0	213	210	0	-4055	30
463	0	0	215	209	0	-3890	30
464	0	0	215	207	0	-3107	30
465	0	0	223	206	-216	-3540	30
466	0	0	225	205	-517	-3381	30
467	0	0	225	205	-915	-3171	30
468	0	0	227	203	-954	-3003	30
469	0	0	227	202	-579	-2905	30
470	0	0	227	200	-1116	-2612	30
471	0	0	226	196	-1026	-2411	30
472	0	0	225	190	-1050	-2210	30
473	0	0	223	195	-1125	-2116	30
474	0	0	225	192	-1004	-1818	30
475	0	0	223	177	-1011	-1664	30
476	0	0	227	174	-969	-1493	30
477	0	0	225	170	-993	-1221	30
478	0	0	227	156	-764	-163	30
479	0	0	223	160	-806	-939	30
480	0	0	223	155	-929	-931	30
481	0	0	221	151	-950	-999	30
482	0	0	225	149	-700	-25	30
483	0	0	218	144	-513	-158	30
484	0	0	210	142	-555	-110	30
485	0	0	218	140	-292	153	30
486	0	0	213	141	-95	290	30
487	0	0	213	142	15	422	30
488	0	0	211	143	79	555	30
489	0	0	215	147	314	579	30
490	0	0	215	151	-175	920	30

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10:20:37 10:20:58 10:21:19 10:21:40 10:22:01 10:22:22 10:22:43


TIME (HH:MM:SS)

ATMOS ATMS 4 JUN 73 AC1 N7550D AC2 RANS557 ATMOS SAMPLE : PHL PD41 PSIV-1

ATMOS VERS. NTREC-4.5

START TIME = -13.33 END TIME = 18.30 ST SCAN = 774 END SCAN = 904
 NPTS FT RC1 = 31 NPTS FT RC2 = 31

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 7 PSIV-2



PAT/PLT ATARS 4 JUN79 RC1 N3305V RC2 N3020 ATARS SAMPLE 1 FNL RD41 PSIV-1
 ATARS VERS. NTAC-4.5 NTAC VERS. NTAC-2.0

-14.30 -12.70 -11.10 -9.50 -7.90 -6.30 -4.70

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
CPHM = 3.409	CPAV = 0.133	CPH = 0.164	XNO = 141.69					
POSNO= 1	RT SCAN 731	HD= 0.133						
	RLT= 3.0							
CPA 0W SCAN 736	SCPA = 0.425							
SCPH = 0.408	SCPV = .729/.749							
RC1 IC = N3305V	CIN DBGS							
RC2 ID = N3020	CIN DBGS							
SCAN	RC1	RC2	POS	TH	RANGE	HD	TV	RZ
774			80	9.25	0.92	13	-321	
775			95	5.55	0.91	9	-211	
776			82	5.16	0.75	4	-104	
777			79	5.77	0.70	-2	3	
778			74	7.37	0.66	-3	56	
779			70	6.95	0.55	-5	78	
780			66	6.45	0.48	-7	78	
781			62	6.17	0.46	-9	67	
782			57	5.75	0.37	-14	52	
783			54	5.37	0.33	-25	36	
784			53	4.99	0.45	-29	22	
785			46	4.59	0.49	-13	12	
786	F		42	4.17	0.43	-4	4	
787	F		39	3.78	0.41	-6	9	
788	F	F	34	3.40	0.47	-3	3	
789	F	F	31	3.01	0.48	-5	14	
790	F	F	25	2.60	0.45	-7	14	
791	F	F	22	2.22	0.46	-9	13	
792	C	C	19	1.86	0.38	-13	91	
793	C	C	13	1.35	0.22	-15	245	
794	C	C	9	0.99	0.13	-16	449	
795	C	C	1	0.60	0.45	-19	621	
796	C	C	33	0.41	0.00	-24	729	
797	C	C	35	0.55	0.00	-31	781	
798	C	C	330	0.03	0.00	-43	757	
799	C	C	671	1.37	0.00	-64	792	
800	C	C	996	1.75	0.00	-106	776	
801	C	C	999	2.14	0.00	-215	756	
802	C	C	999	2.17	0.00	-747	739	
803	C	C	999	2.32	0.00	-599	711	
804	C	C	999	3.15	0.00	-572		

C-16

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START TIME = 10:41:33 END TIME = 10:43:33 ST SCRN = 774 END SCRN = 904
NPTS RT AC1 = 31 NPTS RT AC2 = 31

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 7 PSIV-2



FIRST FLASHING ON SCRN 787
AC1 ID = N3305V CON DBRS
X = -9.01 Y = 16.07
Z = 3500 MDC = 160
AC2 ID = N3023 CON DBRS
X = -9.30 Y = 12.29
Z = 3500 MDC = 21

SCRN	AC1	AC2	VEL1	VEL2	VR1	VR2	DOT	TCD
774	0	0	271	116	1605	-3231	30	
775	0	0	271	116	1550	-3095	30	
776	0	0	259	113	1567	-2938	30	
777	0	0	266	114	1567	-2709	30	
778	0	0	266	115	1341	-2643	30	
779	0	0	265	115	1027	-2561	30	
780	0	0	264	117	711	-2361	30	
781	0	0	261	117	439	-2222	30	
782	0	0	262	116	238	-2014	30	
783	0	0	252	115	95	-1925	30	
784	0	0	263	117	-5	-1775	30	
785	0	0	253	115	-53	-1636	30	
786	0	0	253	119	-71	-1495	30	
787	0	0	262	119	-73	-1351	30	
788	0	0	263	116	-63	-1204	30	
789	0	0	263	112	-45	-1060	30	
790	0	0	265	112	-31	-917	30	
791	0	0	264	112	-19	-776	30	
792	0	0	262	115	422	-633	30	
793	0	0	257	115	1098	-194	30	
794	0	0	257	117	1638	-363	30	
795	0	0	261	115	1635	-153	30	
796	0	0	267	115	1930	32	3398	
797	0	0	270	114	1501	1.61	3659	
798	0	0	271	114	1113	1.43	3333	
799	0	0	273	116	143	501	3993	
800	0	0	271	117	439	542	3999	
801	0	0	269	115	211	137	3553	
802	0	0	265	117	55	553	3999	
803	0	0	270	116	-31	819	3353	
804	0	0	276	116	-75	395	3399	

C-17

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PAT/PAT ATARG 4 JUN 73 AC1 N3305V AC2 N3023 ATRS SAMPLE : PHM PH41 PSIV-1
ATRS VERS. NTAC-4.5 NAVEC VERSION 2.0

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
START TIME = 10:33:13 END TIME = 10:33:45 ST SCAN = 535 END SCAN = 551
NPTS FT AC1 = 27 NPTS FT AC2 = 27

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 8 PSIV-5

CPA4 = 0.209 CPAV = 0.300
POSEND= 1 RT SCAN 643 RD= 0.201
ALT: 46.4 XRD= 259.90

CPA ON SCAN 649 SCPA = 0.242
SCPAH = 0.203 SCPAV = 747.376
AC1 ID = N9206 C3N CRSC

AC2 ID = N9223N CON CASS




PRT/PNT 47906 4 JUN 79 AC1 N9206 AC2 N9223N ATRS SAMPLE : PHL PD43 PSIV-3
ATRS VERS. ATAC-4.5 NIFEC VERSION 2.0

START TIME = 10:31:20 END TIME = 10:33:4 ST SCAN = 635 END SCAN = 661
 NP78 RT AC1 = 27 NP78 RT AC2 = 27

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 8 PSIV-5

380.00 360.00 340.00 *10⁻³ ALTITUDE (FEET)



10:31:15 10:31:34 10:31:53 10:32:12 10:32:31 10:32:50 10:33:09
 TIME (HH:MM:SS)


PRYPLT ATARS 4 JUN 79 AC1 N9206 AC2 N9223N ATARS SAMPLE : PHL PD43 PSIV-3
 ATARS VERS. NTREC-4.5 NTREC VERSION 2.0

2

C-19

INIT TIME = 10 33 53 END TIME = 10 33 53 ST SCAN = 531 END SCAN = 659
 NPTS FT RC1 = 29 NPTS FT RC2 = 29.

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 9 PSIV-7



PR/PLT ATRS 4 JUN 79 RC1 TH18 RC2 N3087V ATRS SAMPLE : PHL PD44 PSIV-4
 ATRS VERS. NTAC-4.5 MAPEC VERSION 2.0


START TIME = 10:33:17 END TIME = 10:33:53 ST SCAN = 631 END SCAN = 659
 MPTS FT AC1 = 29 MPTS FT AC2 = 29

ENCOUNTER NUMBER 9 PSIV-7

AC1 ID = TH118 CON DABS
 X = -23.34 Y = 16.38
 Z = 6925 HDG = 103

AC2 ID = N3097V CON DABS
 X = -18.56 Y = 16.99
 Z = 6500 HDG = 209

SCAN	AC1	AC2	VEL1	VEL2	VIR	DBT	TCMD
631	C	C	285	276	1499	-4327	30
632	C	C	285	290	1499	-4122	30
633	C	C	285	279	1500	-3894	30
634	C	C	285	284	1500	-3582	30
635	C	C	282	278	1500	-3399	30
636	C	C	281	280	1500	-3159	30
637	C	C	280	280	1500	-2222	30
638	C	C	277	278	1500	-2671	30
639	C	C	277	275	1294	-2330	30
640	C	C	276	271	983	-2192	30
641	C	C	276	681	-1879	30	
642	C	C	278	420	-1166	30	
643	C	C	278	267	220	-1550	30
644	C	C	278	269	81	-1121	30
645	C	C	275	266	-5	-1104	30
646	C	C	292	270	-56	-863	30
647	C	C	260	273	-69	-651	30
648	C	C	262	273	-67	-422	30
649	C	C	276	280	-57	-198	30
650	C	C	276	283	-14	48	99999
651	C	C	275	282	30	258	99999
652	C	C	276	282	18	497	99999
653	C	C	276	277	13	707	99999
654	C	C	275	275	4	925	99999
655	C	C	277	277	-0	1198	99999
656	C	C	278	280	-2	1428	99999
657	C	C	276	276	-3	1593	99999
658	C	C	275	283	-3	1859	99999
659	C	C	274	284	-2	2056	99999



10:31:57 10:32:17 10:32:37 10:32:57 10:33:17 10:33:37 10:33:57
 TIME (HH:MM:SS)

PRV/PLT ATRS 4 JUN79 AC1 TH118 AC2 N3097V STARS SAMPLE : PH: PD44 PSIV-4
 ATRS VERS. MTRC-4.5 MTRC VERSION 2.0

GLOSSARY

ALARM	An ATARS message consisting of an FPWI and/or command
BADCOM	A candidate aircraft cockpit display for displaying ATARS messages to the pilot
CPA	Closest point of approach
CPAH	Horizontal CPA
CPAV	Vertical CPA
DATA BLOCK	That grouping of operational data, e.g., ACID, SPEED, ALTITUDE, associated with an aircraft target and displayed to the controller on his PVD.
DESENSITIZATION	Suppression of some ATARS data link information (FPWI and/or command) to the aircraft and ATC facility when the aircraft is located within a specified three dimensional zone and meets specified operational conditions.
ENCOUNTER	Exists whenever ATARS issues a message (OPWI, FPWI, or command) to one or more aircraft.
EQUIPPED	The status of an aircraft that has a DABS transponder with altitude encoder and a cockpit display for ATARS messages.
FAZ	Final approach zone within which the ATARS was desensitized.
FPWI	Flashing proximity warning indicator (See appendix B)
MD	Miss Distance--The projected CPA between an aircraft pair in the horizontal plane
NR	Negative resolution advisory or command (see appendix B).
OPWI	Ordinary proximity warning indicator (See appendix B)
PR	Positive resolution advisory or command (see appendix B).
SATELLITE AIRPORT	An airport other than the primary airport associated with an ATC facility for which that ATC facility assumes the responsibility for the control of aircraft operating under instrument flight rules.

SCAN	One complete 360° rotation of the DABS antenna (4 seconds)
SCPAH	Horizontal separation at slant range CPA
SCPAV	Vertical separation at slant range CPA
TCA	Terminal Control Area—Controlled airspace extending upward from the surface or higher to specified altitudes within which all aircraft are subject to operating rules and pilot and equipment requirements specified in FAR Part 91.
TH	Modified horizontal tau (See appendix B)
TRACON	Terminal Radar Control Facility
TRSAs	Terminal Radar Service Area—Airspace surrounding designated airports wherein ATC provides radar vectoring, sequencing, and separation on a full time basis for all IFR and participating VFR aircraft.
T _V	Time to coaltitude for a pair of aircraft (See appendix B)
UNEQUIPPED	In ATARS terms, the status of an aircraft that has an ATCRBS transponder with an altitude encoder but no capability to receive or display uplinked data from ATARS.
VECTOR LINE	A display technique used on a controllers PVD to indicate the projected track of an aircraft target. The vector line is controlled in length by a system parameter time, e.g., 60 seconds.

